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The opioid epidemic affects all generations—even those unborn.1
Fetuses can be exposed in utero to substances that a pregnant
woman ingests.2 State courts are arriving at different conclusions
about how to handle these expectant mothers’ drug use: specifically,
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1. Julie Turkewitz, ‘The Pills Are Everywhere’: How the Opioid Crisis Claims Its Young-
est Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/20/us/opioid-
deaths-children.html.
2. Beth A. Logan et al., Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome: Treatment and Pediatric Out-
comes, 56 CLINICALOBSTETRICS&GYNECOLOGY 186, 187 (2013).
168 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
whether women should be held criminally liable.3 These women
may not have started to use opioids for illicit purposes.4 In fact,
they may have taken steps to mitigate the adverse effects of opioids
on their fetus.5 However, courts are finding these women criminally
liable without taking the disease of addiction or a woman’s intent
into account.6 Notably, fathers are not prosecuted.7 This crime is
only being prosecuted against a single gender: women.8
This article proposes that prosecuting women for child endanger-
ment to a fetus is a gender-based crime,9 violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Constitution.10 Opening the door to litigation
for opioid use during pregnancy can lead to the prosecution of
women for their lack of prenatal care,11 which disproportionately
affects marginalized women from lower socioeconomic back-
grounds.12 Prosecuting women is not deterring them from abusing
drugs during pregnancy; rather, it is forcing women to forego basic
medical care for fear of serving prison time and losing custody of
their unborn child.13 Part I of this article provides a brief history of
the constitutional protections for women under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and Due Process Clause. Part II gives an overview of
the opioid epidemic. Part III discusses the dichotomy between state
judicial and legislative approaches to women who give birth to chil-
dren addicted to opioids. Part IV argues that prosecuting women
for ingesting drugs during pregnancy creates a gender-based crime
that perpetuates gender stereotypes. Finally, this article concludes
that prosecuting women for prenatal conduct violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
3. See generally Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006); State v. Louk, 786 S.E.2d
219 (W. Va. 2016).
4. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. K.M., 133 A.3d 643, 645 n.2 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (noting that opioids were prescribed to a friend for knee pain).
5. Id. at 645 46.
6. Id. at 648.
7. Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing Pregnancy, 92 IND. L.J. 947, 995 (2017) (“[L]egisla-
tors continue to disregard the significant role . . . the father’s own behavior play[s] in harms
experienced by a developing fetus and child.”).
8. Vanessa Reid Soderberg, More Than Receptacles: An International Human Rights
Analysis of Criminalizing Pregnancy in the United States, 31 BERKELEY J. GENDERL.&JUST.
299, 325 (2016). In this article, “women” refers to cisgender women and people with uteruses.
9. Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and
the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 772, 808 (2020).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”).
11. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (Md. 2006).
12. See generally Bridges, supra note 9.
13. Livia Areas-Holmblad, The Legal Consequences of Using Drugs While Preg-
nant, ADDICTION NOW (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.drugaddictionnow.com/2017/01/20/legal-
consequences-using-drugs-pregnant/3/.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
The United States Constitution was enacted to curtail govern-
ment infringement of citizens’ rights.14 Mothers, as well as all other
citizens, are entitled to rights that protect them from government
interference under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.15
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause defends protected classes of individ-
uals to ensure that similarly situated people are not treated differ-
ently.16 Equal Protection warrants judicial scrutiny at differing lev-
els.17 Strict scrutiny requires that the law at issue be narrowly tai-
lored to the accomplishment of a compelling government interest.18
Rational basis scrutiny requires only that a challenged statute be
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.19 The United
States Supreme Court has also found an “intermediate scrutiny
plus” standard for gender classifications.20 This requires a state to
provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” that the chal-
lenged law is substantially related to some important governmental
objective.21
Statutes that distinguish between males and females are subject
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.22 In fact, the crea-
tion of a gender-based crime involving heightened sanctions must
be substantially related to the achievement of its purpose.23
In United States v. Virginia,24 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Constitution precludes public institutions from being
accessible solely to men.25 The Court found that “a party seeking to
uphold [a] government action based on sex must establish an ‘ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification’ for the classification.”26 To
14. Ward Farnsworth,Women Under Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1235 36 (2000).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. Id. (including race and gender).
17. Randal S. Jeffrey, Equal Protection in State Courts: The New Economic Equality
Rights, 17 L. & INEQ. 239, 350 (1999).
18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
19. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
20. James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of
Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2307 (2006).
21. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 34 (1996).
22. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
23. Country v. Parratt, 684 F.2d 588, 592 (8th Cir. 1982).
24. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
25. Id. at 519.
26. Id. at 524 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
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succeed in an action based on sex, the state must show “at least that
the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.’”27 The Court soundly noted
that sex classifications “may not be used, as they once were, . . . to
create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women.”28 Just as states can have some role in the Due Process
context,29 states also control the “gates to opportunity” under Equal
Protection.30 However, states “may not rely on ‘overbroad’ general-
izations to make ‘judgments about people that are likely to . . . per-
petuate historical patterns of discrimination.’”31 The Court closed
by reminding the courts below that gender-based classifications are
subject to heightened scrutiny.32
Notwithstanding, the Court has upheld gender classifications
based on stereotypes.33 To be upheld, the laws must satisfy an im-
portant governmental objective.34 Reduction in economic disparity
between men and women caused by “the long history of discrimina-
tion” has been recognized as such an objective.35 However, “the
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an auto-
matic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual pur-
poses underlying a statutory scheme.”36 Statutes that discriminate
based on gender have been upheld, but the lawmust still satisfy the
heightened standard.37
Pregnancy discrimination, which has been reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court, has seen an evolution of greater pro-
tection.38 The Court began its analysis in Geduldig v. Aiello,39
where it held that an employment insurance package was constitu-
tional where it excluded pregnancy as a disability.40 The Court
stated that this was not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause
27. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
28. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (citation omitted).
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
30. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541.
31. Id. at 542 (alteration in original) (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S.
127, 139 n.11 (1994)).
32. Id. at 555.
33. See, e.g., M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Rotsker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981).
34. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976).
35. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
36. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
37. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
38. Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional
Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 868 69 (2014).
39. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
40. Id. at 497.
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because “[t]he program divides potential recipients into two
groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the
first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes.”41 However, the Court did not comment on the decision
of whether pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination by
opining that, “[w]hile it is true that only women can become preg-
nant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concern-
ing pregnancy is a sex-based classification . . . .”42
Congress has since passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
which finds that for purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,43 preg-
nancy discrimination is sex discrimination.44 Following the Act’s
passage, the Court refined its prior holding in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty.45 In Satty, the Court found that pregnancy discrimination
may be sex discrimination.46 However, until the Supreme Court
has held definitively that pregnancy discrimination is subject to
heightened scrutiny, like gender discrimination, pregnancy dis-
crimination may be subject only to a rational basis standard.47
B. The Due Process Clause
The right of privacy is recognized as a “liberty” interest under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48 Privacy is an
implicit fundamental right that protects citizens from governmen-
tal intrusion.49 Privacy has been interpreted to include the “inter-
est in independence in making certain kinds of important deci-
sions.”50 Decisional privacy, such as when a mother chooses to con-
tinue or terminate her pregnancy,51 is designed to protect personal
affairs, that are central to an individual’s person, from
41. Id. at 496 n.20.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
45. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
46. Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on
Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381, 407
(2008).
47. Monica Carusello, Sentencing Pregnant Drug Addicts: Why the Child Endangerment
Enhancement Is Not Appropriate, 5 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER& SOC. JUST. 69, 79 (2016).
48. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 56 (1973).
49. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926 27 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
50. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 600 (1977).
51. Julia Epstein, The Sacred Body in Law and Literature: The Pregnant Imagination,
Fetal Rights, and Women’s Bodies: A Historical Inquiry, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 139, 160
(1995).
172 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 59
governmental intrusion.52 Once an interest has been classified as a
fundamental right, then the government must show a compelling
reason to intervene in order to survive strict scrutiny.53
The right of privacy was first established by the United States
Supreme Court in a First Amendment case that held that parents
have the right to educate their children as they choose.54 Since
then, the right of privacy has been contemplated and found in mat-
ters of marriage and family life.55 “Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and cer-
tain intimate conduct,” and protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private place.56
There is considerable support for the right to privacy encompass-
ing the right to procreate, but a fetus’ right of autonomy is part of
ongoing dispute.57 The decision to bear children is “at the very
heart” of these constitutionally protected choices.58 In Griswold v.
Connecticut,59 the United States Supreme Court recognized that
married couples have a right to privacy in the context of contracep-
tion.60 The Court emphasized that not only does the Fourteenth
Amendment protect privacy, but that “the First Amendment has a
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intru-
sion.”61 Further, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been de-
scribed “as protection against all governmental invasions ‘of the
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”62 The Court
concluded that the right of privacy is a protected right.63
52. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitu-
tion?, 58 NOTREDAME L. REV. 445, 446 67 (1983).
53. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
54. SeeMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
55. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (holding same-sex couples
have a fundamental right to marry); Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (recognizing a right to choose whether
to terminate pregnancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that there is a
right to choose one’s spouse irrespective of race); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (recognizing a right to procreate); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)
(holding there is a right to select the type of schooling of children in one’s custody).
56. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
57. Exploring the right of a fetus to bodily autonomy is beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, the focus of this article is the autonomy of mothers to carry their pregnancy to full-
term without being forced to face criminal charges.
58. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
59. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. Id. at 485.
61. Id. at 483.
62. Id. at 484 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
63. Id. at 485; see also id. at 491 (“To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so
deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that
right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever.”) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
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The Supreme Court has continued to extend the right of pri-
vacy.64 In Eisenstadt v. Baird,65 the Court recognized a right to pri-
vacy for unmarried individuals to have contraceptives.66 The Court
emphasized that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”67
In Roe v. Wade,68 the court addressed that women have a right to
privacy in their decision to terminate a pregnancy.69 The Court be-
gan by stating the limits of personal privacy, yet acknowledged that
the right has extended into marriage, procreation, and child rear-
ing.70 The Court concluded that the decision to have an abortion is
a protected right of privacy, but it “is not absolute and is subject to
some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become
dominant.”71 Notably, however, “the word ‘person,’ as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn,”72 thus, fe-
tuses are not entitled to Due Process rights and Equal Protection
under the law.73 Although fetuses do not receive this protection, the
Court recognized that the state “does have an important and legit-
imate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the preg-
nant woman . . . and that it has still [another] important and legit-
imate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.”74 The
state’s interest in both the pregnant woman and the fetus grows as
the woman comes to term.75
Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,76 the Court refined its holding in Roe, and explained that
although the State has an interest in preserving the life of both the
born and unborn, “[b]efore viability, the State’s interests are not
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition
of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the
64. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 454.
67. Id. at 453.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Id. at 164 67.
70. Id. at 152 53.
71. Id. at 155.
72. Id. at 158.
73. William E. Buelow III, To Be and Not to Be: Inconsistencies in the Law Regarding the
Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 963, 986 (1998).
74. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
75. Id. at 163.
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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procedure.”77 The Court established that the liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause is a “rational continuum” and “includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions” such that it re-
quires “particularly careful scrutiny” when a state attempts to
abridge this right.78
II. THEOPIOID EPIDEMIC
Every day, more than 130 people die in the United States from
overdosing on opioids.79 Use and abuse of opioids and opiates has
transformed our society.80 These opioids, consisting of prescription
pain relievers, heroin, codeine, oxycodone, and synthetic opioids,
like fentanyl, affect the youngest to oldest members of society.81
Prescriptions for opioids increased in the late 1990s and have since
surged since the 2010s.82 The number of prescriptions becomes
even more alarming upon discovering that approximately three out
of four new heroin users say they abused prescription opioids before
turning to heroin.83 The Center for Disease Control (CDC) esti-
mates that the “economic burden” of prescription opioid misuse, in
the United States alone, is $78.5 billion per year, including costs of
healthcare and criminal justice involvement.84
The Opioid Crisis is not new; rather, litigation has been ongoing
since the early 2000s,85 involving oxycodone (OxyContin).86 Purdue
Pharma, a manufacturer of OxyContin, produced documents during
77. Id. at 846.
78. Id. at 848 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
79. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 19,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/.
80. Commonly Used Terms, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 5, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/opioids/terms.html (defining that opiates refers to natural
opioids, like heroin, morphine, and codeine, and that opioids refer to all natural, semisyn-
thetic, and synthetic opioids).
81. Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27, 2020),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis#one.
82. Opioid Prescribing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (July 6, 2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/opioids/index.html.
83. Mina Dixon Davis, “Bad Moms” and Powerful Prosecutors: Why a Public Health Ap-
proach to Maternal Drug Use Is Necessary to Lessen the Hardship Borne by Women in the
South, 25 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 305, 308 (2018).
84. Curtis Florence et al., The Economic Burden of Prescription Opioid Overdose, Abuse,
and Dependence in the United States, 54 MED. CARE 901 (2016).
85. Alexander C. Egilman et al., Confidentiality Orders and Public Interest in Drug and
Medical Device Litigation, 180 [J]AMA INTERNALMED. 292 (2019).
86. See Medication Guide Oxycontin, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/media/78453/download (“A strong prescription pain medicine that con-
tains an opioid (narcotic) that is used to manage pain severe enough to require daily around-
the-clock, long-term treatment with an opioid, when other pain treatments such as non-opi-
oid pain medicines or immediate-release opioid medicines do not treat your pain well enough
or you cannot tolerate them.”).
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litigation detailing how the company down-played the drug’s risk of
abuse and addiction.87 However, this leaked information is one of
only few pieces revealed to the public due to drug companies pursu-
ing settlement.88 Though, the tides may change soon because the
population harmed by opioids continues to grow and may lead to
more class action lawsuits due to similar factual circumstances—
for example, newborns with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome
(NAS).89
NAS is a withdrawal symptom that “impacts newborns who were
exposed to opioids in utero, and then are rapidly shut off from access
to the drug at birth.”90 Effects include “excessive high-pitched cry,
reduced quality and length of sleep after a feeding, increased mus-
cle tone, tremors, and convulsions . . . dysregulation ([including]
sweating, frequent yawning and sneezing, increased respiration)
and gastrointestinal signs ([such as] excessive sucking, poor feed-
ing, regurgitation or vomiting, and loose or watery stools).”91 Hos-
pitals are becoming inundated with babies born with NAS: citing a
rise from 13,500 in 2009 to 25,000 in 2016.92 In Pennsylvania alone,
NAS rates increased by over one thousand percent between 2000
and 2018.93 Despite the severity of symptoms, there is little re-
search discussing the impact of pregnant opioid use or NAS on long-
term brain development.94 The uncertainty of the long-term impact
of NAS has generated much debate about whether pregnant women
should be prosecuted for drug use.95
Like all drug addiction, opioid addiction is a disease.96 TheWorld
Health Organization promulgated an authoritative definition of
87. Egilman et al., supra note 85.
88. Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the Opioid
Epidemic, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2301, 2302–03 (2017).
89. Id. at 2304.
90. Cara O’Connor, A Guiding Hand or a Slap on the Wrist: Can Drug Courts Be the
Solution to Maternal Opioid Use?, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 108 (2019).
91. Id. at 108–09 (alterations in original) (quoting Beth A. Logan et al., Neonatal Absti-
nence Syndrome: Treatment and Pediatric Outcomes, 56 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 168 (2013)).
92. Sean Withington & Shannon M. Monnat, The Increase in Neonatal Abstinence Syn-
drome from Opioids Affects Us All, LERNER CTR. FOR PUB. HEALTH
PROMOTION (Apr. 16, 2019), https://lernercenter.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Within
gton_NAS_FINAL.pdf.
93. Id.
94. See Fran Smith, Babies Fall Victim to the Opioid Crisis, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2017/09/science-
of-addiction-babies-opioids.
95. See Cara Angelotta & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal Charges for Child Harm from
Substance Use in Pregnancy, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 193 (2017).
96. S. REP. NO. 92-1071, at 3 (1971) (expanding the Narcotic Addiction Rehabilitation
Act to include methadone maintenance).
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heroin addiction, which lists characteristics such as a “strong desire
or need to continue taking the drug,” “a psychic dependence on the
effects of the drug,” and “a physical dependence on the effects of the
drug requiring its presence for maintenance of homeostasis and re-
sulting in a definite, characteristic, and self-limited abstinence syn-
drome when the drug is withdrawn.”97 Congress has also defined
“addict” to include one “who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic
drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his
addiction.”98
The United States Supreme Court, in Robinson v. California,99
held that addiction is not a crime; rather, it is an illness “which may
be contracted innocently or involuntarily,”100 and cannot be prose-
cuted. Justice Douglas concluded that addiction is not punishable
as a crime101 because, “[i]f addicts can be punished for their addic-
tion, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. Each
has a disease and each must be treated as a sick person.”102
III. DICHOTOMY OF APPROACHES
Courts and legislatures have been working to identify the poten-
tial liability for drug use during pregnancy.103 Their efforts show
the vast difference in interpreting the requirements for pregnant
women.104
A. Judicial Approach
The most frequently relied upon case for fetal child abuse due to
drug addiction deals with cocaine.105 Regina Kilmon gave birth to
a baby boy that had the presence of cocaine in his bloodstream.106
Ms. Kilmon was charged with second degree child abuse, reckless
endangerment, and possession of a controlled substance and pled
guilty to reckless endangerment.107 The Maryland Supreme Court
looked to its child endangerment statute, where in relevant part
97. WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], WHO TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 273: WHO
EXPERT COMMITTEE ON ADDICTION-PRODUCINGDRUGS 13 14 (1964).
98. 21 U.S.C. § 802(1).
99. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
100. Id. at 667.
101. Id. at 674 (Douglas, J., concurring).
102. Id.
103. See Barry M. Lester et al., Substance Use During Pregnancy: Time for Policy to Catch
Up with Research, HARM REDUCTION J., Apr. 20, 2004, at 3.
104. See id.
105. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. 2006).
105. Id. at 307.
106. Id.
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states, that a person recklessly “engage[s] in conduct that creates a
substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another.”108
The court held that “another” meant another person.109 As such,
the person allegedly endangered by Ms. Kilmon’s conduct was not
the fetus, but the child, after the child’s birth.110
The court recognized that an injury committed while a child is
still in utero can produce criminal liability if the child is later born
alive.111 DistinguishingWilliams, the court noted that reckless en-
dangerment, not intent to injure, is the key element of the of-
fense.112 The court took issue that if the statute is applied to the
effect of a pregnant woman’s conduct on the fetus she is carrying, it
could be construed to include not just the ingestion of unlawful con-
trolled substances “but a whole host of intentional and conceivably
reckless activity that could not possibly have been within the con-
templation of the Legislature . . . .”113 The court then provided a list
of the potentially reckless behavior that could be captured under
the reckless endangerment statute:
everything from becoming (or remaining) pregnant with
knowledge that the child likely will have a genetic disorder
that may cause serious disability or death, to the continued use
of legal drugs that are contraindicated during pregnancy, to
consuming alcoholic beverages to excess, to smoking, to not
maintaining a proper and sufficient diet, to avoiding proper
and available prenatal medical care, to failing to wear a seat
belt while driving, to violating other traffic laws in ways that
create a substantial risk of producing or exacerbating personal
injury to her child, to exercising too much or too little, indeed
to engaging in virtually any injury-prone activity that, should
an injury occur, might reasonably be expected to endanger the
life or safety of the child. Such ordinary things as skiing or
horseback riding could produce criminal liability.114
The court acknowledged that a pregnant woman, like anyone
else, may be prosecuted for her own possession of controlled
107. Id.
108. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-204(a)(1) (emphasis added).
109. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 308.
110. Id. at 309.
111. Id. at 310; see, e.g., Williams v. State, 561 A.2d 216, 219 (Md. 1989) (concluding that
when a pregnant woman was shot with an arrow and child died shortly after birth that de-
fendant could lawfully be convicted of manslaughter for the death of the child).
112. Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 311.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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substances.115 Despite being importuned on numerous occasions,
the Maryland General Assembly has “chosen not to impose addi-
tional criminal penalties for the effect that her ingestion of those
substances might have on the child, either before or after birth.”116
Recognizing an anomaly in the jurisprudence, the court proffered
that it would be nonsensical that a pregnant woman who, by ingest-
ing drugs and recklessly causing the death of a viable fetus, would
suffer no criminal liability for manslaughter, but, if the child sur-
vived, she could be imprisoned for five years for reckless endanger-
ment.117
Subsequently, New Jersey addressed whether a pregnant woman
seeking treatment for her opioid addiction can be held criminally
responsible for her child being born with NAS.118 At a routine doc-
tor’s appointment, Y.N. learned that she was four months preg-
nant.119 During the preceding four months, Y.N. had been taking
Percocet120 for injuries from a car accident and became dependent
on the medication.121 Hospital staff advised her not to stop taking
Percocet abruptly because it could endanger her pregnancy.122 In-
stead, hospital staff recommended that Y.N. enter a methadone
maintenance treatment program, which she did four months later,
just a month before she gave birth to her son.123 Y.N.’s son suffered
methadone withdrawal symptoms at birth and remained hospital-
ized for about seven weeks.124
Y.N. was found strictly liable for abuse and neglect.125 The New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed and held “absent exceptional cir-
cumstances, a finding of abuse or neglect cannot be sustained based
solely on a newborn’s enduring methadone withdrawal following a
mother’s timely participation in a bona fide treatment program pre-
scribed by a licensed healthcare professional to whom she has made
115. Id. at 314.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. Y.N., 104 A.3d 244 (N.J. 2014).
119. Id. at 246.
120. Percocet contains oxycodone, an opioid, and is used to treat moderate to severe pain.
See Percocet (Oxycodone and Acetaminophen Tablets, USP), ENDO PHARMS. (July 2018),
https://www.endo.com/File%20Library/Products/Prescribing%20Information/PERCOCET_
prescribing_information.html. The FDA warns that there has been not been established
study indicating that Percocet is safe to use during pregnancy. Id.




125. Id. But see N.J. Dep’t of Child. & Families, Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 59
A.3d 576, 590 (N.J. 2013) (holding that mother had not abused or neglected her child when
the infant was born with cocaine metabolites in her system because the record revealed little
about any future degree of harm).
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full disclosure.”126 The court referenced the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services and concluded that methadone
maintenance treatment can save the lives of newborns.127 Although
the infant may experience methadone withdrawal, ultimately, it is
better than the infant being addicted to heroin.128 The court rea-
soned that, finding a mother liable of abuse or neglect as a result of
her newborn’s NAS diagnosis, after the mother made an informed
medical decision to undergo methadone maintenance treatment,
would discourage women from entering detoxification programs
that may improve their child’s health.129
The Vermont Supreme Court addressed a similar issue regarding
whether a woman should continue her use of opioids during preg-
nancy.130 In that case, the pregnant woman revealed to a nurse that
she had been using street buprenorphine.131 The nurse educated
that she should continue to use the drug to avoid intrauterine dam-
age to the fetus and herself if she were to suddenly stop.132 The
nurse prescribed Subutex (buprenorphine),133 but her son was born
opioid-dependent and required two months of treatment.134 The
court held that because the mother was suspended from treatment,
accessed un-prescribed Subutex off the street, and did not return to
a medically monitored program until a month before the birth of
her child, the mother was guilty of child abuse towards the fetus.135
Justice Beth Robinson, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
noted that the court “should not presume that every child born opi-
oid-dependent is by definition [abused] on account of the fact that
the child developed an opioid dependence in utero.”136 Child-protec-
tion statutes are not designed to punish prepartum conduct.137 Alt-
hough a parent’s conduct prior to a child’s birth may support infer-
ences about the parent’s ability to care for the child upon birth, Jus-
tice Robinson did not believe that an abuse finding is predicated
126. Y.N., 104 A.3d at 246.
127. Id. at 255 56.
128. Id. at 256.
129. Id.
130. In reM.M., 133 A.3d 379 (Vt. 2015).
131. Id. at 382.
132. Id.
133. Subutex is used to treat opioid dependence. See Subutex (Buprenorphine Sublingual
Tablets) for Sublingual Administration, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 2018),
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2018/020732s018lbl.pdf. Subutex can
result in NAS. Id.
134. In re M.M., 133 A.3d at 382.
135. Id. at 386.
136. Id. at 389 (Robinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 390.
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based on harm inflicted on a fetus before birth.138 Studies have
shown that fear of punitive responses and loss of custody is a deter-
rent to pregnant women seeking treatment for drug addiction.139 A
policy, presumptively holding that a child born with NAS is abused,
would deter pregnant opioid-addicted women from taking steps to
protect both their own health and that of their fetus.140
The West Virginia Supreme Court handled the novel situation of
whether a pregnant woman could be convicted of child neglect re-
sulting in death, when a child is born addicted to methampheta-
mines and consequently dies.141 Stephanie Louk intravenously in-
jected methamphetamines when she was thirty-seven weeks preg-
nant.142 Within a few hours of the injection, Ms. Louk began expe-
riencing breathing problems and went to the hospital.143 Doctors
diagnosed Ms. Louk with acute respiratory distress which, when
pregnant, displaces the blood that usually goes to the fetus and di-
verts it back to the woman.144 Doctors performed an emergency ce-
sarean, and upon delivery, the child was pronounced brain dead.145
The child died eleven days later.146 Ms. Louk was convicted of one
felony count of child neglect resulting in death and sentenced to
three to fifteen years’ incarceration.147
Citing to Kilmon, the West Virginia Supreme Court expressed
concerns that numerous prenatal activities could harm the fetus,
such as poor nutrition, poor prenatal care, and caffeine consump-
tion.148 The court was concerned about the same anomaly, that pre-
natal ingestion of drugs resulting in the birth of a surviving child
would be criminalized but the same conduct resulting in the fetus
dying in utero would not be criminalized.149 The court overturned
Ms. Louk’s conviction, but stated that with the rising opioid epi-
demic, the legislature would need to rewrite the statute if they
wanted prenatal conduct criminalized.150
Most recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed
whether a woman’s use of opioids while pregnant, which results in
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 394.
141. State v. Louk, 786 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 2016).
142. Id. at 220.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 221.
145. Id. at 222.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 225 26.
149. Id. at 226.
150. Id. at 228.
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a child born suffering from NAS, constitutes child abuse.151 The
woman was released from incarceration and relapsed into drug ad-
diction, specifically using opioids and marijuana.152 Upon learning
she was pregnant, she sought treatment for her addiction, first
through a methadone maintenance program, and then with
Subutex.153 She relapsed, and a couple of weeks before giving birth,
she tested positive for opiates, benzodiazepines, and marijuana—
none of which were prescribed to her.154 Within three days of her
child being born, the child began exhibiting symptoms of NAS.155
Child and family services filed a dependency petition alleging,
among other things, that the child was a victim of child abuse by a
perpetrator, and the mother caused bodily injury to the child
through a recent act.156
The case was decided based on the unambiguous language of the
Pennsylvania child abuse statute.157 Although the opinion primar-
ily focused on whether the fetus was considered a child in utero and
whether the woman was considered a mother prior to birth, the
court held that the woman was not a perpetrator of child abuse.158
In addition, the court opined that labeling a woman as a perpetrator
of child abuse does not prevent her from becoming pregnant, and it
does not ensure that the same woman will not use illegal drugs if
she becomes pregnant again.159 Once given the label of a perpetra-
tor of abuse, the likelihood that a new mother will be able to assim-
ilate into the workforce and participate in activities in the child’s
life would be diminished.160
Contrasting with the preceding cases, the Tennessee Court of Ap-
peals did not consider any privacy or policy considerations in favor
of the mother and, rather, focused on the child when deciding pre-
natal opioid use.161 The appellate court addressed whether a
woman’s drug use during pregnancy constituted severe child abuse
where she had previously given birth to a child who was harmed by
drug abuse.162 In this case, the mother had previously given birth
to a child suffering from NAS, and she had been referred to a
151. In re L.J.B., 199 A.3d 868, 870 (Pa. 2018).





157. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6386.
158. In re L.J.B., 199 A.3d at 877.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
162. Id. at 845.
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methadone clinic.163 She was expelled from the methadone clinic
due to her use of methamphetamine—a violation of the clinic’s
rules.164 About a year later, she was taken to a hospital for a possi-
ble drug overdose when she discovered she was pregnant.165 Sub-
sequently, she used methadone purchased illegally and failed to re-
ceive prenatal care.166 Her son was born prematurely and exhibited
signs of opiate withdrawal.167 The court held that severe child
abuse can be found where a child is born injured from exposure to
opiates during pregnancy.168
Although the facts of each case are unique, the courts, overall,
seem to be coming to nearly the same conclusion: pregnant women
cannot be found criminally responsible for their prenatal use of opi-
oids.169 Courts are concerned with the woman’s fundamental right
to privacy.170 If the courts follow Tennessee’s lead and issue a find-
ing of child abuse whenever a child is born with injuries sustained
from the mother’s prenatal opioid use, it can potentially open the
door to a wider range of conduct that the courts can control.171 How-
ever, courts have opined that the decision of criminal culpability
may not be an issue for the judicial branch to handle; rather, it
should be decided by the legislatures.172 As the West Virginia Su-
preme Court stated, it is for the legislature to define what consti-
tutes child abuse and whether that includes specific prenatal con-
duct, including consumption of illegal substances.173
B. Legislative Approach
Maryland has created a statute that specifically addresses re-
porting on substance-exposed newborns.174 Therein, Maryland de-
fines controlled substances to include all substances on Schedules I
through V.175 Newborn is also defined as “a child under the age of




166. Id. at 845 46.
167. Id. at 846.
168. Id. at 850.
169. See, e.g., Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 314 (Md. 2006); State v. Louk, 786 S.E.2d
219, 228 (W. Va. 2016).
170. See Kilmon, 905 A.2d at 311.
171. Id.; see In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d at 844.
172. See Louk, 786 S.E.2d at 228.
173. Id.
174. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704.2.
175. Id. § 5-704.2(a)(2).
176. Id. § 5-704.2(a)(4).
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statute states that a new born is “substance-exposed” where the
newborn:
(1) displays a positive toxicology screen for a controlled drug as
evidenced by an appropriate test after birth; (2) displays the
effects of controlled drug use or symptoms of withdrawal re-
sulting from prenatal controlled drug exposure as determined
by medical personnel; or (3) displays the effects of a fetal alco-
hol spectrum disorder.177
Thus, the statute addresses not only prenatal drug use but also
prenatal alcohol use.178 Most importantly, the statute states that
“[a] report made under this section does not create a presumption
that a child has been or will be abused or neglected,” thus, express-
ing the intent that expectant women are not subject to strict liabil-
ity for prenatal conduct.179 The Legislature is leaving it to the
courts to determine whether the prenatal conduct of the mother is
indicative of abuse.180
New Jersey has yet to pass a statute specifically addressing new-
borns and instead relies upon its general child abuse statute.181 Un-
der the New Jersey statute, a child is defined as “any child alleged
to have been abused or neglected.”182 An abused or neglected child
is “a child less than 18 years of age whose parent or guardian . . .
inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by
other than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial
risk of death, or serious or protracted disfigurement . . . .”183 The
statute is quite broad and allows courts to interpret the statute as
they see fit.184 However, the New Jersey legislature has introduced
multiple bills in the last few years seeking to address substance-
exposed newborns, indicating that the legislature may, in a few
years, more strictly define abuse in this context.185
West Virginia views controlled substance use during pregnancy
as falling under its child neglect statute.186 Therein, the statute
simply refers to whether a parent, guardian, or custodian, neglects
177. Id. § 5-704.2(b).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 5-704.2(i).
180. Id.
181. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21.
182. Id. § 9:6-8.21(b).
183. Id. § 9:6-8.21(c).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 926, 217th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016).
186. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-4a.
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a child under his or her custody or control.187 This is one of the
broadest statutes and makes no reference to what constitutes ne-
glect or abuse.188 This provides courts with broad discretion in their
decision-making.189 The West Virginia Supreme Court in Louk
called for a stricter statute due to this broad power. Because West
Virginia is the leader in opioid overdoses,190 it is likely that a
stricter statute will be created.191
Similarly to New Jersey and West Virginia, Pennsylvania also
does not have a statute specifically addressing newborns affected
by NAS.192 Integral in the decision of In re L.J.B., was the definition
of perpetrator of abuse, postulating that it must be, among others,
the parent of the child.193 Child abuse is defined as “intentionally,
knowingly[,] or recklessly . . . [c]ausing bodily injury to a child
through any recent act or failure to act.”194 In the case, the opinion
turned upon the definition of parent and child, which in the statute,
does not specifically address whether a fetus is a child and at what
point one becomes a parent.195
Tennessee, although not possessing a statute solely addressing
prenatal conduct, does have provisions dealing with child abuse re-
sulting from consumption of illegal substances.196 A child is defined
as anyone under eighteen years of age.197 Severe child abuse is de-
fined as “[t]he knowing exposure of a child to or the knowing failure
to protect a child from abuse or neglect that is likely to cause serious
bodily injury or death . . . .”198 Severe child abuse can also be found
where a parent knowingly allows a child “to be present within a
structure where the act of creating methamphetamine . . . is occur-
ring . . . .”199 Furthermore, severe child abuse exists where a parent
“[k]nowingly or with gross negligence allow[s] a child under eight
187. Id. § 61-8D-4a(a).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. West Virginia: Opioid-Involved Deaths and Related Harms, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drug-topics/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-
state/west-virginia-opioid-involved-deaths-related-harms.
191. See generally Nathan R. Hamons, Addicted to Hope: Abating the Opioid Epidemic
and Seeking Redress from Opioid Distributors for Creating a Public Nuisance, 121 W. VA. L.
REV. 257 (2018).
192. Compare In re L.J.B., 199 A.3d 868 (Pa. 2018), with 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303.
193. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303.
194. Id. § 6303(b.1).
195. The definitions of when one becomes a parent and when one is considered a child is
a major issue when discussing whether mothers should be held liable for their prenatal con-
duct, but it will not be addressed here.
196. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102.
197. Id. § 37-1-102(b)(5)(A).
198. Id. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(A)(i).
199. Id. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(D).
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(8) years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled sub-
stance that results in the child testing positive on a drug screen,
except as legally prescribed to the child.”200 As the court found in
In re Benjamin M., a child also includes a fetus.201 Although the
statute does not specifically address fetal conduct, the statute can
be construed to a finding of child abuse.202
Florida has specifically addressed substance exposure in new-
borns.203 Harm is found where a child has been exposed to a con-
trolled substance or alcohol.204 This can be determined by “[a] test,
administered at birth, which indicate[s] that the child’s blood,
urine, or meconium contained any amount of alcohol or a controlled
substance or metabolites of such substances, the presence of which
was not the result of medical treatment administered to the mother
or the newborn infant.”205 Florida has specifically carved out that
a mother has harmed her child, but this is not a presumptive find-
ing of child abuse.206 Florida, like the states above, has left it to the
discretion of the courts.207
States have implemented new statutes and regulations to better
protect babies born with NAS and get care for women addicted to
opioids.208 Twenty-five states and the District of Columbia require
health care professionals to report suspected prenatal drug use.209
Eight states require health care professionals to test for prenatal
drug exposure if they suspect drug use.210 Nineteen states have ei-
ther created or funded drug treatment programs specifically target-
ing pregnant women,211 and an additional seventeen states and the
District of Columbia provide pregnant women with priority access
200. Id. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E).
201. In re Benjamin M., 310 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009).
202. Id.
203. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01.
204. Id. § 39.01(35)(g).
205. Id. § 39.01(35)(g)(1).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See generally AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, NO. 711, OPIOID USE
ANDOPIOIDUSEDISORDER IN PREGNANCY (Aug. 2017).
209. Substance Use During Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/substance-use-during-pregnancy (Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin).
210. Id. (Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and South Dakota).
211. Id. (Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin).
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to state-funded drug treatment programs.212 Moreover, ten states
prohibit publicly funded drug treatment programs from discrimi-
nating against pregnant women.213
State legislatures are taking a wide array of approaches to ad-
dress the opioid epidemic’s effect on newborns.214 As the opioid ep-
idemic continues, more legislation specifically addressing sub-
stance exposure in newborns, like in Maryland, will likely be writ-
ten.215 As seen in Maryland and Florida, the statutes not only ad-
dress opioids but other illegal substances and alcohol.216 As other
states write or amend their legislation, opioids, alcohol, and possi-
bly other prenatal conduct may be introduced as a finding of harm
to a fetus.217
IV. CRIMINALIZING PREGNANCY CREATES AGENDER-BASED
CRIME
Most states, and the federal government, criminalize “substance
possession, not use, criminalizing substance use during pregnancy
represents an expansion of the criminal law.”218 This expansion of
criminal law will only be prosecuted against those people who can
become pregnant: women.219 Thus, because pregnancy is a neces-
sary element of substance use during pregnancy, this criminaliza-
tion creates a gender-based crime.220
These statutes have treated pregnancy as an essential element
for criminal prosecution, thereby exclusively crafting a statute that
applies to women and no one else.221 Looking at a study between
1973 and 2005, most of the more than 400 interventions of pregnant
women for substance use during pregnancy,222 “pregnancy provided
212. Id. (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin).
213. Id. (Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma,
and Tennessee).
214. See Bridges, supra note 9, at 810 14.
215. See id.
216. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01; MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-704.2.
217. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (Md. 2006).
218. Bridges, supra note 9, at 808.
219. Id.
220. Id. This article recognizes the implications of criminalizing pregnancy, and specifi-
cally looks at how this disproportionately affects minorities. This is a valid argument, but it
is beyond the scope of this article.
221. Priscilla A. Ocen, Birthing Injustice: Pregnancy as a Status Offense, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1163, 1167 (2017).
222. See generally Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions
on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status
and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y& L. 299 (2013).
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a ‘but for’ factor, meaning that but for the pregnancy, the action
taken against the woman would not have occurred.”223
The most common response to why substance use should be crim-
inalized during pregnancy is that the criminal justice system oper-
ates as an effective deterrent to convince pregnant women with sub-
stance use disorder to get treatment.224 The idea is that a pregnant
woman suffering from drug dependence will choose treatment,
thereby increasing the probability that she will stop abusing drugs
and give birth to a healthy child.225
However, criminalizing substance use during pregnancy opens
the door to a slippery slope for the criminalization of other activi-
ties—even legal activity—that can pose a risk to fetuses.226 This is
far from a novel idea: women have historically been refused the op-
portunity to have certain jobs227 and equal employment benefits.228
Today, new legislation has been proposed to criminalize cigarette
smoking by pregnant women,229 but this may just be the beginning.
This endangers not only women who use opioids during pregnancy,
but even women who fail to obtain prenatal care.230 Lynn Paltrow,
program director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women,
states that “according constitutional rights to fetuses would not
only jeopardize women’s lives and health by denying them access to
legal abortion[s], but would also undermine substantially their sta-
tus as constitutional persons including their ability to participate
as full and equal citizens in our society.”231 If a woman is held crim-
inally responsible, then she may be listed on a child abuse registry
223. Id. at 301.
224. Bridges, supra note 9, at 804.
225. Erin D. Kampschmidt, Prosecuting Women for Drug Use During Pregnancy: The
Criminal Justice System Should Step Out and the Affordable Care Act Should Step Up, 25
HEALTHMATRIX 487, 501 02 (2015).
226. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (Md. 2006).
227. SeeMuller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (holding that legislation is justified to
protect women from the greed and passion of man); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 132
(1872) (recognizing that God created different sexes and that they are to belong to separate
roles).
228. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976) (challenging private in-
surance plans that excluded pregnancy); overruled by Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
229. Timor Faber et al., Smoke-Free Legislation and Child Health, 26 PRIMARY CARE
RESPIRATORYMED. 16067 (2016).
230. See, e.g., Antonia Noori Farzan, Yes, You Can Fail a Drug Test by Eating a Poppy
Seed Bagel, as a Maryland Mother Learned, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018, 6:22 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/08/08/yes-you-can-fail-a-drug-
test-by-eating-a-poppy-seed-bagel-as-a-maryland-mother-learned/ (explaining that mothers
have been reported to state services for testing positive for opiates without allowing mothers
to explain that they had eaten a poppy seed bagel).
231. LynnM. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat toRoe v. Wade,
62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1009 (1999).
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which can result in potential reputational harms, such as impeding
the ability to obtain employment.232 Thus, the more rights and pro-
tections that are given to fetuses, the fewer that remain for the
woman who carries the fetus.233
Although violating the fundamental right to bear children is, on
its own, enough to trigger strict scrutiny under Equal Protection,
the protected status of addiction is also subject to heightened scru-
tiny.234 If “drug use by pregnant women is [a crime], then preg-
nancy constitutes ‘a necessary element of a remarkable new status-
based criminal offense: [p]regnancy by a drug-dependent person, or
drug use by a pregnant woman.’”235 It is the “coexistence of two
unpunishable statuses—a drug addiction and pregnancy”—that re-
sults in the creation of a “new status crime.”236
Moreover, prosecuting pregnant women violates Equal Protec-
tion because this robs women of the fundamental right to bear chil-
dren.237 The right to procreate is “one of the basic civil rights
. . . .”238 Skinner clearly held that the right to beget a child is a fun-
damental right that cannot be abridged without satisfying strict
scrutiny.239 Punishing mothers who are drug-addicted burdens
their right to bear children.240 Here, although there is a state in-
terest in protecting the life of fetuses,241 there is currently not
enough research to determine how much opioid use during preg-
nancy will affect the fetus, or even if there will be any long-term
effects.242 Moreover, states are only recognizing the woman’s role
in fetal health, and failing to recognize the male role.243 By prose-
cuting women for their prenatal conduct, courts are punishing
232. See Kane v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 960 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Me.
2008) (holding that “[t]he stigma of being listed as ‘substantiated’ for child abuse combined
with the adverse professional and social consequences of being listed in the database impli-
cates a fundamental liberty interest.”).
233. Ehrlich, supra note 46, at 382 83.
234. Id. at 412.
235. Doretta Massardo McGinnis, Comment, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-Exposed Ba-
bies: Constitutional and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 520 (1990) (alteration in
original).
236. Id.
237. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
238. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
239. Id.
240. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1464 (1991).
241. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
242. Smith, supra note 94.
243. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 997
(1984).
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women for addiction and opening the floodgates to future litigation
for other conduct.244
A. Criminalizing Pregnancy Perpetuates Gender Stereotypes
Legislators focus exclusively on the pregnant woman’s role in the
health of the fetus, while failing to recognize that men also have an
impact.245 The United States Supreme Court opined that male
health may have just as much influence on the fetus as the ex-
pectant woman’s health.246 A man’s exposure to toxins in his work-
place can be potentially damaging to fetal development.247 There is
even a similarly proposed potential harm linking paternal drug use
and fetal health.248 Both male and female alcohol consumption de-
creased the chance of a live birth and increased the risk of a mis-
carriage.249
Smoking can also damage sperm DNA.250 For example, heavy
smoking by a man at the time of conception “increases the child’s
risk of childhood leukemia and shortens [the] reproductive lifespan
of daughters.”251 Beyond the effect that exposure to toxins, smok-
ing, and drinking alcohol have on a man’s sperm, his “drug use in
the presence of a pregnant partner could potentially further impact
fetal health . . . .”252 Legislators’ refusal to incorporate the male’s
role in fetal health merely continues the stereotypes of
parenthood.253
B. Prosecuting Women Fails to Deter Drug Use
Women are being treated as incubators for new life while their
fundamental interests in liberty and freedom of autonomy are
244. See Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311 (Md. 2006).
245. See, e.g., Richard Collier, Masculinities, Law, and Personal Life: Towards a New
Framework for Understanding Men, Law, and Gender, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 447
(2010).
246. Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 188 (1991).
247. Id. at 198.
248. Collier, supra note 245, at 447.
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constrained.254 Five states have enacted laws that authorize the
civil commitment and detainment of pregnant women for their use
of drugs and alcohol.255 These laws have been criticized as permit-
ting an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.256 Specifically, Wis-
consin’s statute257 was struck down as violative of the Due Process
Clause because it “affords neither fair warning as to the conduct it
prohibits nor reasonably precise standards for its enforcement.”258
Paltrow commented that the continued enforcement of civil commit-
ment law:
takes away from a pregnant woman virtually every right asso-
ciated with constitutional personhood—from the most basic
right to physical liberty to the right to refuse bad medical ad-
vice . . . [t]his kind of dangerous, authoritarian state-action, is
exactly what happens when laws give police officers and other
state actors the authority to treat fertilized eggs, embryos, and
fetuses as if they are already completely separate from the
pregnant woman.259
The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists argues
that “punitive policies are potentially counterproductive because
they are likely to discourage prenatal care and successful treatment
while undermining the patient-physician relationship.”260 Instead,
legislators, judges, and prosecutors are choosing to criminalize
pregnancy and push opioid-using women away from prenatal
care.261
Courts acknowledge that prosecuting pregnant women poten-
tially incentivizes abortion because the law better protects a drug
addicted woman who chooses to terminate her fetus than a woman
who gives birth to a child after abusing substances during her preg-
nancy.262 This does not deter women from stopping consumption of
254. Goodwin, supra note 38, at 814.
255. MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-22; OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-
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opioids; rather, these prosecutions deter pregnant women from
seeking prenatal care and drug counseling.263
C. Women and Fetal Rights
Fetal rights have been recognized by Congress under the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act (UVVA).264 The UVVAmakes conduct caus-
ing the death or injury of a fetus a separate offense, punishable by
the same sentence, such as in cases of murder or assault.265 The
UVVA applies where the individual killed was a pregnant woman,
regardless of the actor’s intent and whether or not the actor knew
the woman was pregnant, effectively making the Act strict liabil-
ity.266 However, the UVVA does not apply to prosecutions of preg-
nant women for giving birth to a child while addicted to opioids.267
In fact, the language of the UVVA specifically exempts any act a
woman undertakes regarding her fetus.268
There is limited information regarding what impact, if any, preg-
nant opioid use or NAS has on long-term brain development.269
Some studies suggest that elementary school children who were ex-
posed to opioids in utero may exhibit “motor and cognitive impair-
ments,” including higher instances of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactiv-
ity Disorder.270 However, the little amount of research that does
exist was completed prior to the widespread use of highly potent
synthetics, such as fentanyl.271
Although the long-term effects are unknown, it is undisputed
that the majority of newborns exposed to opioids in utero will expe-
rience withdrawal.272 Treating a fetus suffering from withdrawal—
not considering the other physical ailments—increases the costs of
the health system.273 An analysis done by the Pennsylvania Health
Care Cost Containment Council found that the hospital care for all
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babies born with substance abuse issues added 27,385 hospital days
in Pennsylvania alone.274 This cost Medicaid an additional $20.3
million dollars.275 These numbers may sound astronomical, but the
average length of a hospital stay for a baby with NAS is thirty
days.276 Once these babies do go home, they are at a higher risk of
neglect or abuse under the care of mothers still battling addic-
tion.277
Current therapies, such as opioid agonist therapy,278 may in-
crease the number of NAS cases.279 Currently, there is no way to
know whether the infants exposed to NAS in utero were exposed to
opioid agonist therapy or to illicit opioids.280 What was discovered,
however, is that women with opioid use disorder undergoing opioid
agonist therapy showed improved outcomes for the mother and
child.281
D. Women Should Not Be Prosecuted for Addiction
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court held that drug addic-
tion is an illness that cannot be criminally punished.282 Opioid ad-
diction rewires the brain.283 The first stage, known as intoxication,
involves opioids producing a reward sensation in the brain.284 The
second stage, known as negative affect, causes the brain to need
more of the opioid to experience the reward sensation, and with-
drawal begins when the drug is not obtained.285 Finally, the brain
enters preoccupation-relapse, which involves chronic relapse, often
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triggered by external cues.286 Although these brain modifications
occur in other addictions, such as alcoholism, the “women targeted
for prosecution based on addiction do not engage in any act other
than giving birth.”287
The National Institute on Drug Abuse suggests that treatment
success should be holistic and include a combination of approaches
that address the entire patient, such as her “age, race, culture, sex-
ual orientation, gender, pregnancy, housing and employment, as
well as physical and sexual abuse.”288 In July of 2016, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA), a
bipartisan effort to help curb the opioid crisis.289 CARA outlines a
number of harm reduction efforts, including a stipulation that
treatment for pregnant women should be prioritized.290 This legis-
lation is certainly a step in the right direction for women to obtain
treatment, but this may still result in them losing custody of their
children.291
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
drawn a distinction between a state requiring a benefit for pregnant
women and a state imposing a burden on pregnant women.292 The
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act showed Congress’ in-
tent that pregnant women are a protected class under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.293 The Court has also held that prosecuting
pregnancy and drug addiction, both of which are independently pro-
tected statuses, violates the Equal Protection Clause.294 Although
there is no constitutionally recognized right to use illicit drugs,295
one does have a constitutionally protected right not to be punished
simply for being addicted.296
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CONCLUSION
Although the opioid epidemic is sending shock waves through so-
ciety, the answer to this crisis does not lie in prosecuting women for
the prenatal use of illicit substances. This punishment tactic does
not deter women from taking opioids; rather, it encourages preg-
nant women to not seek prenatal care. Due to the possibility of fac-
ing criminal punishment, women may even feel pressured to termi-
nate their pregnancy. States have created a gender-based crime,
arguably violating Equal Protection, when states should instead be
seeking new treatment methods for all that have fallen victim to
the disease of addiction.
State legislatures and courts need to work together to better pro-
tect children born with NAS, without punishing an expectant
woman’s prenatal conduct. States could potentially hold expectant
fathers’ criminally responsible for their role in fetal health; how-
ever, courts would still be penalizing individuals for their addiction.
Thus, instead of prosecuting women for their role in fetal health,
courts and legislators should seek to better help women by provid-
ing rehabilitation and counseling.
